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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Craig Carlsen, appeals from his convic-
tion of grand larceny in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
7G-38-4 (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Craig Carlsen, was charged with the 
crime of grand larceny by information filed in the First 
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, in and for 
Box Elder County. He was arraigned on February 21, 1969, 
where he entered a plea of not guilty. Trial by jury com-
menced on May 7, 1969, and concluded the same day. The 
jury found the defendant guilty of the crime charged in 
the information. On May 27, 1969, the defendant was sen-
tenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than ten years. The 
2 
court granted stays of execution until August 14, 1969, 
where the court again sentenced the defendant to the Utah 
State Prison for a term of not less than one nor mo1:e tlia.1 
ten years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the decision of the District 
Cc.:nt :.hould be affirmed. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 5, 1969, Mr. Wallace A. Bowden, an em-
ployee of the Salt Lake Sanitation Treatment Plant at 650 
West 3300 South in Salt Lake City, Utah, observed, while 
at work, a panel truck and an automobile pull up at the 
gate of the plant and transfer white meat packages from 
the truck to the car. This observation was made with the 
aid of field glasses. Mr. Bowden then telephoned the county 
sheriff to report the suspicious conduct of the three defen-
dants charged in the information. Minutes later, Mr. Earl 
W. Julian of the County Sheriff's Office arrived at the 




THE APPELLANT WAS AT NO TIME DE-
PRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
OF PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF 
TION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER 
THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENTS OF THE UNITED ST ATES CONSTI-
1 UTlON. 
The appellant contends that he was deprived of his 
constitutional warning prior to incriminating statements 
made by himself. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 
(1966), the Supreme Court of the United States held that 
police must inform an individual of his constitutional rights 
prior to interrogation, but same restrictions on the applica-
tion of the holding were placed. In the instant case, Officer 
Julian arrived at the scene of the suspicious conduct re-
ported by Mr. Bowden and asked the appellant what he was 
doing with the meat (Tr. 28). The appellant then answered 
that the meat had been brought down from the Dale Olsen 
Distributing Company for selling purposes (Tr. 28). It is 
quite clear that at this point of the investigation by Officer 
Julian, no right to a constitutional warning had arisen. It 
was not clear, at that point of time, that the defendant had 
committed a crime. There was merely sufficient evidence 
to investigate further and the court in Miranda, directing 
itself to that point, stated: 
"General on-the-scene questioning as to facts 
surrounding a crime or other general questioning 
of citizens in the fact finding process is not affected 
by our holding." Miranda v. Arizona, supra. (Em-
phasis added.) 
In a similar case in the Second Circuit, United States 
v. Thomas, 396 F. 2d 310 (2nd Cir. 1968), railroad police-
men observed two suspects carrying cartons late at night 
near a railroad yard. When stopped by the officers, the 
two men made exculpatory statements which were later 
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used in their conviction. The court in that case determined 
that at that point in time no arrest had been made and that 
no significant deprivation of freedom had occurred. The 
court pointed to the fact that no restraining, frisking or 
handcuffing had taken place and therefore under such cir-
cumstances, the questioning which related to where the de-
fendants had obtained the cartons they were carrying, was 
held to be on-the-scene questioning to determine if a crime 
had been committed, and not a custodial interrogation. 
In Jennings v. United States, 391 F. 2d 512 (5th Cir. 
1968), a policeman was examining a parked automobile on 
which a theft had been reported. The defendant approached 
the officer and asked what the trouble was and at that point 
the officer responded by asking the defendant if he owned 
the car. The defendant stated that he was the owner and 
produced a registration and drivers license which patently 
did not belong to him. All of this was prior to arrest and 
was determined by the court not to be a custodial interro-
gation. 
In still another case, United States v. Gibson, 392 F. 
2d 373 (4th Cir. 1968), an officer, knowing that the auto-
mobile in question may have been stolen, pursued defen-
dant into a tavern, asked him to step outside, and there 
proceeded to question defendant as to the ownership of the 
car, all prior to a constitutional rights warning. 
Therefore, the question asked by Officer Julian in the 
instant case, was within the scope of on-the-scene question-
ing or routine investigation of circumstances of a suspi-
cious nature to determine if a crime had been committed, 
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and conse(1uently no warning of the defendant's constitu-
l ional rights was, at that time, appropriate or required. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT WAS AT NO TIME DE-
PRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL UNDER THE S I X T H AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, it is true the court held 
that an accused person does have the right to counsel when 
he is first subjected to interrogation. Again, however, the 
court in Miranda directed itself to the scope of its holding 
in stating that on-the-scene questioning as to facts sur-
rounding the crime or the general questioning of citizens in 
theo fact finding process did not give rise to the rules relat-
ing to warnings and waivers. Therefore, for the same rea-
sons as established in Point I of respondent's brief, the 
a.ppellant was at no time denied his constitutional rights to 
>rnrnings and waivers. 
POINT III. 
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED 
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO AD-
MONISH WITNESSES TO REMAIN SEPA-
RATED WHEN EXCLUDED FR 0 M THE 
COURTROOM. 
The appellant alleges prejudicial error for the trial 
court's failure to admonish witnesses excluded from court 
and error by the trial court for failing to comply with Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-15-12 (1953), which provides: 
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"While a witness is under examinati1m, thP. 
magistrate may exclude all witnesses who have not 
been examined. He may also cause the witnesses 
to be kept separate, and to be prevented from con-
versing with each other until they have all been 
examined." (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant also alleges that there is a statutory duty of a 
magistrate to admonish witness under Rule 43 (F), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: 
"Upon motion of either party, the court shall 
exclude from the courtroom any witness of the ad-
verse party, so that he may not hear the testimony 
of the other witnesses." 
A close reading of both Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-12 (1953), 
and Rule 43 (F), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, will show 
that in neither statute can a statutory duty be found upon 
the magistrate to admonish witnesses. At best, the magis-
trate's obligation rests with an exercise of his discretionary 
power in such matters and in the instant case such an ex-
ercise was in favor of not admonishing the witnesses. 
Whitely v. State, 418 P. 2d 164 (Wyo. 1966); State v. 
Kendrick, 239 Ore. 512, 398 P. 2d 471 (1966); State v. 
Denton, 101 Ariz. 455, 420 P. 2d 930 ( 1966). 
However, appellant contends that even the failure to 
admonish here was prejudicial error. Respondent submits 
iL was not. Appellant seeks to impart same thread of collu-
sion in testimony between plaintiff's attorney and wit-
nesses during a conference at lunch on the morning of May 
7, 1969. As the transcript will show (Tr. 58, 61, 62), no 
discussion between plaintiff's attorney and witnesses was 
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ePgaged in regarding Mr. Hill's testimony later that same 
day 
Consequently, for the above stated reasons, appellant's 
allegation of prejudicial error is utterly without merit. 
POINT IV. 
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR IS TO BE FOUND 
IN THE JURY CHARGE. 
Appellant erroneously contends that two statements 
were made by the court in its instructions to the jury which 
were prejudicial. A close examination of the jury charge 
will show that neither of the statements were made to the 
jury. 
First, appellant claims that the court instructed the 
jury in instruction numbered two, paragraph numbered 
first, that, "A special right to possession is sufficient basis 
to establish ownership." Nowhere in the above stated in-
struction or paragraph, or anywhere else in the jury in--
structions, is such a statement to be found. What the court 
did instruct in instruction numbered two and paragraph 
numbered five was "and so the state must establish either 
that Gary Hill was such owner or that he had some kind of 
a special ownership or special right to possession of the 
same so that it can be said that, for the purpose of a thief 
or thievery, that he was the owner." (Emphasis added.) 
Such an instruction, of course, does not, whatsoever, con-
note the same meaning as appellant's erroneously alleged 
instruction. Borrelli v. State, 453 P. 2d 312 (Okla. 1969); 
People v. Price, 46 C. A. 2d 59, 115 P. 2d 225 ( 1941). 
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Second, the appellant contends that the court, in in-
struction numbered five, committed prejudicial enor in 
stating "in fact, the evidence points to the contrary." 
Again, a close reading of the jury instruction will bear out 
the fact that no such instruction or comment was ever 
made. Rather, the comment in question was stricken from 
the instructions prior to the court's delivery of the said 
instructions. 
Consequently, appellant's contentions in his point IV 
are erroneous and entirely without merit. 
POINT V. 
DENIAL BY THE COURT OF D E F E N S E 
COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF 
ACQUITTAL NOTWITHSTANDING THE VER-
DICT WAS PROPER. 
Appellant's last point requires a two-part response. 
He first contends that there was a break in the evi-
dence leading to the conviction of defendant. As can be 
sE=oen, however, from Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-1 (1953), the 
state did complete the chain of prima facie evidence of 
guilt. The section reads: 
"Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, car-
rying, leading or driving away the personal prop-
erty of another. Possession of property recently 
stolen, when the person in possession fails to make 
a satisfactory explanation, shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence of guilt." (Emphasis ours.) 
Consequently, the fact that respondent did show the 
stolen property of Gary Hill (Tr. 7 5) to be in the posses-
:: 1·1t1 of the defendant (Tr. 28) without satisfactory expla-
1rnt. •n as to ownership (Tr. 28), was prima facie evidence 
uf guilt; to-wit, the inference that the defendant did commit 
the larceny and that this inference with all other circum-
stances could be considered by the jury in determining 
whether or not the defendant was beyond a reasonable 
doubt guilty of such larceny. State v. Allred, 16 U. 2d 41, 
395 P. 2d 535 (1964); State v. Wood, 2 U. 2d 34, 268 P. 2d 
998 (1954). 
Appellant contends in his Point V that the information 
as filed \Vas defective in that it failed to identify the ap-
propriate name of the aggrieved party; to wit, the partner-
ship name of Box Elder Meat Packing Company. From 
this allegation, appellant contends that the respondent failed 
tc make its proof in conformance with the alleged defective 
information, since the stolen property may have been the 
personal property of Mr. Hill's partner in the business. 
However, it is easily seen that the information filed naming 
the personal property as that of one Mr. Gary Hill, falls 
directly within the purview of Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-17 
(1953), which states: 
"Whenever it is necessary in an information, 
indictment, or bill of particulars, to make any aver-
ment as to or to describe any personal property be-
longing to several partners or owners, it is suf fi-
cient to refer to or describe such property as be-
longing to any one or more of such partners, with-
out naming them all, or to state that anyone or more 
of such partners or owners had a right of possession 
of such property without naming them all." (Em-
phasis ours.) 
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Therefore, the trial court's denial of appellant's motion 
for judgment of acquittal, notwithstanding the verdict, was 
proper and appellant's Point V is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing facts and authorities, the re-
spondent respectfully submits that the appellant was not 
denied any of the constitutional rights, that the court com-
mitted no prejudicial error, the defendant's motion was 
properly denied and the judgment of the district court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
